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At its meeting on 20 November 1984, the Committee on Budgetary Control 
appointed Mr. Battersby as member responsible tor budgetary control 
aspects of the fisheries sector of the EC budget. 
On 14 January 1985, Parliament authorised the Committee on Budgetary 
Control to prepare a report on budgetary control with regard to the 
measures taken under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
At its meeting on 23 April 1985, the Committee confirmed the mandate of 
Mr. Battersby as rapporteur. 
1he Committee on Budgetary Control considered the draft report at its 
meetings on 23/24 April 1985 and 14/15 May 1985. At the latter meeting 
the Motion for a Resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none 
against and one abstention. 
Present at the time of voting: Mr. Aigner, chairman; Mr. Martin, vice-
chairman; Mrs. Boserup, vice-chairman; Mr. Battersby, vice-chairman and 
rapporteur; Mr. Arndt <deputising for Mr. Wettig); Mr. Bardong; Mr. 
Dimitriadis; Mrs. Fuillet; Mrs. Lentz-Cornette; Mr. Pitt; Mr. Price; 
Mr. Schon; Mr. Tomlinson <deputising for Mr. Schreiber). 
The opinion of the Committee on Agriculture will be given orally. 
The report was tabled on 21 May 1985. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to the report will be indicated in 
the draft agenda for the part session at which it will be debated. 
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The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution (together with explanatory statement): 
A 
~Q!lQ~_fQB_~-B~§Qb~IlQ~ 
on budgetary control with regard to the measures taken under the Common 
Fisheries Policy 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution on the need for urgent 
investigation of alleged frauds affecting the common fisheries 
policy (Doc. 2-699/84); 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
(Doc. A 2-34/85), 
A. Conscious of the importance of ensuring that European taxpayers' money 
should be put to the best use in all policies of the Community; 
B. Anxious that the relatively new Common Fisheries Policy should meet the 
desires of the Community institutions expressed at its inception for a 
well-structured European fishing industry, a proper system of conserva-
tion and management of the resource and adequate mechanisms of 
inspection and control; 
C. Concerned about recent allegations of widespread irregularities, 
notably overfishing and inadequate national measures to control it; 
D. Eager to ensure that: 
a) these shortcomings are set right as soon as possible; 
b) the budgetary objectives in the fisheries sector indicated in 
Title 4, in particular Chapter 40, are fully respected; 
c) the control and policing of this new policy should be made to 
operate in a manner that will constitute a model for other 
policies; 
E. Aware of the potentially Large costs to the community budget in this 
sector which may result from the impending enlargement. 
1. Recalls that by regulations No. 3796/81(1) of 29 December 1981 and 
No. 170/83(2) of 25 January 1983 the Common Fisheries Policy was 
established on a Long-term basis by strengthening the common organisation 
of the market and setting up a Community system for the conservation and 
management of fishery resources; 
(1)0J L.379/81 
(2)0J L.24/83 
- 5 - PE 97.194/fin. 
2. Notes that the new system for the organisation of the market has proved 
successful in limiting expenditure on withdrawals and urges that it should 
be maintained in its present form as an example for other sectors of the 
Community; 
3. Is concerned, however, at reports of infringements in relation to overfishing, 
alleged official collusion in relation to breaches of Community legislation 
and failure by national authorities to deal with the problem; 
4. Insists that sound budgetary management and the safeguarding of Community 
resources in the widest sense demand that concrete steps be taken to 
improve the situation, particularly in the context of enlargement; 
5. Invites the Coun~il to inform Member State governments of the Parliament's 
dissatisfac~ion with the failure of most national authorities to deal 
adequately with this situation; 
6. Approves the decision of the Commission to initiate the infringement 
procedure under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty in relation to overfishing 
but finds it to be an indicator of serious potential difficulty in the 
implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy; 
7. Observes that as part of the establishment plan of the Commission, the 
budgetary authority provided for an inspectorate to maintain effective 
control of the new policy and believes that the inspectorate should be 
. 
reinforced to reach an eventual total of 30; 
8. Invites the Commission, in the interests of transparency, to propose 
the consolidation of the fisheries budget under one Title heading; 
9. Calls on the Merrber States to excmine urgently the possibility of taking measures to ensure 
that similar and non-discriminatory sanctions will apply to similar violations of the Common 
Fisheries Policy regulations in Member States and their waters and to ensure that those directly 
responsible for specific contraventions of Community law pay the penalty; 
10. Urges the Commission to establish as a matter of urgency a permanent 
register of all infringements in the fisheries sector, giving all 
relevant details, those details to be entered within 30 days of the 
penalty incurred being imposed; 
11. Calls on the Commission to report on progress in relation to the above 
proposals by 1 October 1985; 
12. Expects the Court of Auditors to keep a continuing watch on the implement-
ation of the budget lines relating to the Common Fisheries Policy; 
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of 
its committee to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now over two years since the Community reached agreement on a new set 
of provisions governing the fisheries sector. These provisions settled 
rights of access, broad allocation of TACs <Total Allowable Catches) and the 
shape of the structural policy. Moreover, they afforded a ,degree of stability 
' 
in that it was agreed that the new regime should remain in force until 
31 December 2002, after a review of the situation at the end of 1992. In this 
way, the arguments which had raged since the establishment of 200 mile EEZs 
(Exclusive Economic Zones) by the Member States at the beginning of 1977 in 
all waters except the Mediterranean were effectively resolved. 
2. Since 1983 the policy has enjoyed important successes. January 1984 was the 
first time that the Council was able to establish at the beginning of the year 
the breakdown of TACs into national quotas for the whole range of Community 
fish( 1). In December 1984 the Ministers improved on this by setting the quotas 
before the year, to which they applied, began( 2). Thus for 1985 the allocation 
of the seven main species Looks as follows: 
Table 1: 
Allocation of 1985 quotas in tonnes 
Species EC total 8 DK D F IRL NL UK 
Cod 466,000 9,260 158,260 87,960 39,820 11,520 26,670 132,510 
Haddock 207,500 1,910 12,170 7,840 21,130 4,050 1,330 159,070 
Saithe 132,300 90 8,390 23,230 74,840 3,060 210 22,480 
Whiting 175,050 3,970 15,870 4,230 39,400 17,800 9,290 84,490 
Plaice 207,870 13,155 42,100 10,780 7,835 3,270 71,820 58,910 
MackereL 385,000 330 8,350 24,330 16,330 80,000 35,330 220,330 
Herring 439,850 9,120 97,260 69,990 37,270 32,880 87,720 105,610 
3. Agreements on the details of quotas have been important in increasing the confi-
dence of fishermen in the ability of the Community to manage this sector of the 
economy. Also important in this respect has been the establishment of the 
(1)Regulation 320/84, OJ L.37/84 
(2)Regulation 1/85, OJ L.1/85 
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fisheries inspectorate, an initiative which the Parliament played an important 
part in fostering. The idea is one that can be traced back to the Klinker 
(1) 
report and was pursued consistently thereafter, notably in the Pery report 
on the coordination of maritime inspection and surveillance operations( 2) As 
a result, posts for 13 inspectors were created in the Commission from 198~. 
4. However, the pattern of success is not uniform. In particular, the framing of 
the policy has left possible loopholes for Community funds to be misdirected 
or misappropriated~ Evidence has a€cumulated to indicate, that there are a 
variety of ways in which those involved in the industry can, with or without 
the connivance of national authorities, evade some of the rules laid down by 
the Community for eligibility to the monies voted under Title 4 of the budget, 
'Common fisheries and marine policy'. It is essential that every effort be 
made now to limit such activity to a minimum and for three main reasons. 
5. Firstly, the policy is a relatively new one and it is reasonable to hope that 
its structures are still flexible enough to be revised. At the same time, the 
size of the budget has witnessed an important increase. In 19e4, both payment 
and commitment appropriations of Title 4 were over 80% up on the 1983 outturn, 
with the 1984 commitment appropriations approaching 160nECUs. This remains a small sum 
in Community terms but it is vital to avoid the major difficulties that the 
larger funds, notably in agriculture, have suffered. 
6. Secondly, Spanish and Portuguese membership of the Community will necessarily 
make implementation more difficult. As the following table indicates, the 
accession of these new Member States will almost double the number of fishermen 
to over 300,000, increase vessel tonnage by nearly 75% and put up the size of 
the EEC fleet by well over half. 
Table 2: 
Number of boats 
Tonnage 
Fishermen 
EEC (10) 
57,000 
1,360,000 
154,000 
Spain 
17,000 
800,000 
111,000 
Portugal 
18,000 
320,000 
38,000 
7. Thirdly, there is the more general agreement that weakness in enforcing regula-
tion will undermine the willingness of fishermen to abide by the rules. Every 
effort has got to be made to ensure that all fishermen know that if their 
colleagues from their own or another country break the Law, they will incur 
( 1) D--
oc. 
(2)D oc. 
441/78 
1-183/82 
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penalties. The result may not be to eliminate law-breaking but at least, 
the credibility of Community-wide regulations would be reinforced. Indeed 
the more credible they become, the stronger the pressure from the industry 
that they be improved. 
8. So far in the development of the CFP, the major difficulties have arisen with 
regard to the common organisation of the market <COM), which comes under the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section. However, it is important to foresee the opportunities 
for fraud that may arise as structural policy in the fisheries sector develops. 
To understand how infringements can occur it is useful to look briefly at the 
nature of policy in these two areas in turn. 
The common organisation of the market 
9. As in agriculture, the COM in fisheries products operates on the basis of a 
common set of prices. Thus for each species covered (the total is at present 
15 as compared to the more than 30 species to which the quota arrangement 
applies>, the Community fixes a guide price according to freshness, size or 
weight and presentation. From this the withdrawal price can be fixed, which 
varies between 70% and 90% of the guide price. In addition, the regulation 
provides for the fixing of an export refund to allow excess supply on the 
Community market to find an outlet. 
10. Within the COM, the Largest expenditure is that devoted to withdrawals from 
the market. This was distributed as follows among the Member States in 1982 
and 1983: 
Table 3: 
Expenditure on withdrawals (in mECU) 
EC 
Total 8 DK D 
1982 20.16 0.37 1.69 1. 62 
1983 17.52 0.15 2.60 1. 92 
GR 
0.01 
F 
2.96 
2.20 
IRL 
1.62 
1.76 
I 
5.99 
2.92 
NL 
0.56 
0.81 
UK 
5.31 
5.10 
11. The first and most obvious difficulty with the COM is the possibility of 
'fishing for FEOGA', by deliberately catching more than the market could absorb. 
Examples of this practice have been uncovered particularly in the case of sardines 
in the Mediterranean, which are both plentiful and unpopular with the consumer. 
In the course of clearing the accounts for 1981-82, the Commission discovered 
that fishermen at Chioggia had gone further and made fake declarations as to the 
amount of sardines they had caught. 
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12. However, the system in operation since 1970 was significantly modified in 
1981 by Regulation 3796/81 and as a result such activity is much more difficult. 
Firstly, the importance of the role of producer organisations (POs) in the 
making of claims for w~thdrawals has been strengthened. Fishermen outside the 
organised framework of a PO are not able to obtain funds from EAGGF. Secondly, 
the amount of fish for which compensation can be claimed and the Level of 
compensation has been timited. Only 20% of the annual catch of a PO of a 
particular 'Species .can benefit and that 20% is itself subdivided into four 
'tranches', subject to a degressive subsidy. The first 'tranche' receives 
85% compensation, the second 70%, the third 55% and the fourth 40% of the 
withdrawal price. Thirdly, POs are obliged to give their members at Least 
2.5% more than the percentage provided from Community funds and in this way 
a degree of financial coresponsibility is introduced into the system. 
13. These changes to the rules have had a significant effect in breaking the Level 
14. 
of expenditure on withdrawals. The outturn in expenditure under Article 4010 
went down from 20.2 mECU in 1982 to 17.5 mECU in 1983 and the rate of utilisation 
of appropriations continued at a Low Level in 1984, Less than half of the monies 
under Chapter 40 having been spent by the end of the year. This decline in expenditure 
should be welcomed and the application of similar degressive forms of support to 
other sectors should be actively considered as a way of Limiting the possibilities 
for fraud. 
A second area of difficulty with the COM has been the provision of export 
restitutions for fish which are in surplus in the Community. An example was 
given by the Court of Auditors in its 1983 annual (1) report • The Court noted 
that for the period 1981-83 the Dutch authorities appeared to pay export 
refunds for amounts of frozen mackerel which exceeded their quota allocation. 
Thus in 1981 the payments pointed to catches four or five times greater than 
those allocated to Dutch fishermen, while in the following two years the quotas 
were still exceeded by 290% and 260%. What is more, the Commission continued 
to pay out Community funds, despite the evident breach in the quotas. As its 
reply to the Court indicates, the Commission recognises that it could be useful 
to delay such payments in the event of uncertainty about the Legality of the 
claims made. Not to do so is to allow Member States the chance to use advances 
to which they are not entitled over a very Long period, until the accounts are 
settled. 
15. It should be added that the provision of such restitutions was formally suspended 
as of 1 November 1983. There had been no limit on the amount of fish that could 
benefit from these measures and there was concern as to the cost involved 
(1) OJ 348 c. , p.63 - 10 - PE 97.194/fin. 
(13.8 mECU in 1982 and 8.2 mECU in 1983). Here a Loophole has been 
temporarily blocked and the Parliament should insist that such payments 
are not restarted until some procedure for safeguarding Community funds is 
devised. 
16. The third area of difficulty with the COM is the more general one of maintaining 
financial support to Member States when they are endangering the whole fisheries 
policy by allowing quotas to be breached. In some cases, it may be Less than 
straightforward for national officials to control what is going on •. A classic 
example is the way in which, in parts of Scotland, box weights have been varied 
to suit different circumstances. Should a fisherman catch above the quota, 
there is a temptation to overload the boxes. As sales are made on the basis of 
a standard weight per box, he has the chance to disguise the extent of his 
catch. On the other hand, when there is not much fish on the market and prices 
rise, the proportion of ice in the box can be raised and the weight of fish 
reduced, thus artificially distorting the value of the catch. In other cases, 
there is reason to believe that national officials are well aware of illegal 
practices and allow them to continue. Here we can point to the success of 
the Community fisheries inspectorate in uncovering a substantial 'grey market' 
operated by the Dutch fishing industry. The inspectors noted that those in 
charge of the auction at Ijmuiden, under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Transport, were issuing two sales notes- one 'official' to be sent to 
Brussels, the other 'grey' indicating the actual catch. By this kind of 
double book-keeping, the amount of fish caught can be dramatically under-stated. 
Thus at another auction in Scheveningen, an inspector noted that official sales 
of sole were set at 1,000 kilos, while the 'grey market' side amounted to 
2,560 kilos. 
17. These examples are illustrations of a much wider pattern of behaviour which 
the Commission revealed at the beginning of this year. It emerged that in 
every Member State concerned there were cases of the agreed quotas 
being broken. Under Regulation 3796/81 a formal Link was established between 
intervention measures financed by FEOGA and the quotas established in the 
context of the management of the resource. Thus intervention is only to be 
supported financially within the quota limits allowed to each state. However, 
the problem comes when quotas are broken but there is no directly-related 
intervention activity. This does not mean that overfishing has no effect on 
the Community budget, only that it is more difficult to assess its precise 
nature and extent. Thus if breaches of t~P quotas continue, it is clear that 
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the livelihood of fishing communities will be threatened and their demands for 
assistance increase. Hence the importance of ensuring that the Community 
inspectorate is of sufficient dimensions and has adequate powers to discourage 
such breaking of quotas. 
18. Finally, it is worth stressing that the problem wilt take on a different 
dimension with the arrival of Spain and Portugal in the Community. Although 
landings are heavily concentrated in a small number of ports, the system in 
place for the collection of statistics and the control of landings is of a 
relatively rudimentary kind. Without a significant increase in the level of 
control, the scope for infringements will be very broad and the tensions 
between the fishing industries of the enlarged Community will be accordingly 
increased. 
The structural measures 
19. In 1983, as well as agreeing on quotas and limits, the Council also approved 
a number of measures designed to provide a structural policy for this sector. 
These included measures to encourage exploratory fishing and cooperation 
through joint ventures in the fishing sector( 1) and certain measures to adjust 
. . h f" h . ( 2) s f h h t d capac1ty 1n t e 1s er1es sector . o ar t ese measures ave genera e no 
expenditure but as was suggested earlier, attention needs to be paid to the 
problem; they may provoke. 
20. Particularly difficult from the point of view of financial management may 
prove the measures to adjust capacity for which 26 mECU, (a sum equivalent to 
that available for withdrawals) were allocated in 1984. Member States are 
permitted by the directives to introduce a system of financial aid for two 
types of measure: 
a temporary reduction of fishing pending the reconstitution of stocks; 
the Laying up for good of old fishing vessels and vessels unsuited to the 
new fishing situation. 
It may well not prove easy to verify that the conditions for aid have been 
fulfilled, particularly where vessels are required to forego fishing for 
Limited periods. Hence it is vital to provide for the possibility of spot-
checks, which could be incorporated into the responsibilities of the Community 
fisheries inspectorate. 
(1)Regulation 2909/83 
(2)Directive 83/515/EEC -12- PE 97.194/fin. 
21. To an important degree, the CFP has proved successful in Limiting the 
possibilities for misuse of Community funds. 'Fishing for FEOGA' has 
ceased to be a practical possibility with the introduction of the 
degressive system of market support and the Commission has used its 
powers to suspend the payment of export restitutions since November 1983. 
However, in two particular areas there is scope for making the fisheries 
sector a still better example for other policy sectors, especially in the 
context of the enlargement. 
22. First, the Community presence in fishing ports must be strengthened. 
Originally 40 fisheries inspectors were envisaged but only 13 are at work 
at present. The Commission should be encouraged to recruit the number of 
inspectors originally suggested and thus to improve its capacity for 
checking on alleged malpractices at the ports or at sea. The inspectors 
may have no sanctions of their own but they are certainly in a position 
to embarrass national authorities into modifying existing practices where 
these clearly run contrary to agreed Community rules. 
23. Second, the responses of Member States to infringements in the fisheries 
sector must be made much Less variable. At the present time, states 
appear to adopt very different positions depending on who is guilty of 
the offence in question. They may be prepared to turn a blind eye or 
to meet the costs of those responsible for contraventions. On the other 
hand, they may be ready to use force or to impose very dramatic fines. 
In these circumstances, there should be a move towards a common system of 
uniform and speedily-imposable penalties. As a first step, the Commission 
should vigorously pursue the search for information in this sector by 
reference to Article 5 of Council Regulation 2057/82, which imposes an 
obligation on the Member States to inform the Commission of the infringe-
ments they have uncovered and how they have responded to them. 
24. By themselves, these moves will not eliminate abuse of the system but they 
can certainly help to create a climate in which illegal behaviour may have 
Less chance of success. Without such improvements there will be little 
to stop fishermen and others in fisheries sector undermining the CFP, 
with the behaviour of the worst in the industry setting a standard for 
the rest. At this early stage in the policy's development and with the 
enlargement of the Community at hand, this is a risk that we cannot afford 
to take. 
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